This week I read what is to-date the best answer I’ve found to feminist scientist and philosopher Donna Haraway’s critique of veganism. If you are unfamiliar with Haraway, see my previous post, in which I challenge the way that Haraway describes veganism. She critiques veganism for seeking to claim innocence from systems that do violence to nonhuman animals.
I offer “Veganisms” by philosopher Robert C. Jones as a response to Haraway. Jones outlines three different types of ethical veganism and defends what he calls revisionary political veganism. (You can read the first two pages of the chapter through the publisher’s preview here).
Vegan aspirations
According to Jones, revisionary political veganism is aspirational. This feature forms the basis of responding to Haraway’s concern. Jones states, “The belief that abstaining from animal products allows one to avoid complicity in harming other animals ignores the complex dynamics involved in the production of consumer goods of all kinds, global entanglements we engage with each time we purchase and consume food of all sorts” (p. 29).
Jones’ political vegan seeks to do they best they can to reduce their participation in unjust systems, while also acknowledging our ongoing and sometimes inevitable complicity in systems of injustice (especially capitalism). As Jones acknowledges, not just humans are harmed in these systems. Animal agriculture often involves systemic injustices to human workers too (here is one example). Various “isms” of oppression, including racism, sexism, and ableism, are connected with violence towards nonhuman animals.
Of course, veganism isn’t just aspirational. Doing the best you can is quite rigorous. In acknowledging systemic injustices with systems of consumption and with consumer capitalism, the political vegan rejects “structures or institutions that link the commodification and exploitation of animals, vulnerable human populations, and the environment” (31).
Veganism in context
Political veganism succeeds in providing a nuanced, contextual analysis of the harms of eating animals. Indeed, Jones argues that some animal-eating people may do better at addressing animal and environmental justice for contextual reasons. Much of veganism falls prey to consumerism; for example, think of the packaging of vegan food products that is not distinguishable in environmental impact from packaging for animal products. (I’ve also written previously about palm oil, another product Jones mentions).
In addition, Jones argues that political veganism is more intersectional than other forms of veganism because it recognizes ways in which forms of oppression are mutually supporting. Further, Jones wants to broaden political veganism to include people who would abstain from animal products if they had the supports to do so.
It is at this point that two questions arise for me. First, does Jones make a strong enough point? More specifically, is revisionary political veganism able to address the implicit whiteness of mainstream vegan activism and scholarship? Second, does revisionary political veganism rely on a commitment to a particular argument for ethical veganism as a foundational principle?
For more on the whiteness of veganism, see A. Breeze Harper’s work through the Sistah Vegan Project, and all her books; Aph Ko‘s work, and the co-authored Aphro-Ism with Syl Ko; Jennifer Polish’s chapter in the same volume as Jones’ essay; Billy-Ray Belcourt’s 2015 paper in Societies (access the full text here); and Margaret Robinson’s writings on veganism (here’s one open-access example).
An intersectional veganism?
I think Jones would want political veganism to respond to critiques that mainstream vegan scholarship and practice is white-centered. It is one thing to see how various structures of domination are inter-connected. But, such arguments might still depend on a white-centered approach (or epistemic framework) to veganism which fails to appreciate the co-constitution of the human/animal binary. As theorists such as Aph and Syl Ko have argued, veganism requires rethinking animality and the way in which some humans are excluded from “humanity” by being rendered “animals.”
To put the point a little differently, it isn’t adequate to challenge speciesism. We must also unpack and challenge the racist foundations of speciesism. Consider this example: Jennifer Polish argues that vegan initiatives which are possible through gentrification and economic displacement might seem to promote intersectional approaches to social justice, but they have colonialist implications (see the first two pages of Polish’s chapter through the publisher preview).
Given that “intersectionality” is such a buzz word, let’s be cautious and critical in how it’s deployed. Perhaps Jones’ could strengthen his position by situating it within a decolonizing framework to addresses the implicit whiteness in many prominent approaches to veganism.
Foundation(s) for veganism
Although I suggested one way in which Jones might make his position stronger, I wonder whether this position is also too rigid. Part of the whiteness of veganism seems to me to be the assumption that veganism depends on a commitment to a foundational or fundamental “first principle” about it being wrong to eat animals. Obviously I agree it is wrong to eat animals (and I’m much closer to advocating for a universal vegan perspective than many feminists), but I worry about the “first principle” aspect. This seems to privilege the simplistic human/animal divide that ignores how some humans have been animalized.
It is not clear to me to what extent Jones wants to avoid “first principles” in political veganism. Against the necessity of first principles is the inclusiveness of political veganism. Recall that some occasional animal-eaters who lack the supports to be fully vegan might be closer to a political vegan practice than the uncritical vegans who don’t incorporate environmental sustainability. However, Jones situates his argument around the case for ethical veganism, which is grounded in the wrongness of eating animals.
The politics of a health-motivated veganism
Although I accept the argument for ethical veganism, there are other arguments for veganism that do not depend on the wrongness of eating animals being front and center. At one time I would have dismissed these arguments for “accidentally” having the correct conclusion, but not for “the right” reasons. I’ve been challenged to re-think that view, and now I think health-related reasons for veganism can be just as ethical and political as my animal-centered veganism.
For example, Michelle R. Loyd-Paige first came to veganism during a spiritual retreat where participants abstained from animal products and sugar to detoxify the body, mind, and spirit. The health benefits she experienced on this detox diet brought her back to vegan eating. Then, Loyd-Paige connected problems with animal consumption and colonial impacts on African Americans. Certainly she views animal suffering as relevant to her veganism and recognizes connections between violence towards animals, racism, and sexism. But, I don’t interpret Loyd-Paige as accepting the argument for ethical veganism as the primary motivator for her vegan practice. She describes her view as follows: “I am convinced that eating a meat-based diet–not to mention dairy products, eggs, and fish–is not only hazardous to food animals and harmful to the land, but, more important to me, perilous to the health of my people” (6, my emphasis).
Decolonizing veganism
I am not sure what Jones would say. He defends revisionary political veganism over identity veganism and boycott veganism. In the latter two models, ethical veganism is the motivating factor for being vegan. But given the recognition of mutually constituting and interlocking sites of oppression, and given the racist underpinning to our understanding of the human/animal binary, I wonder if the revisionary political vegan needs to be motivated foremost by a commitment to ending violence towards animals. I am a white, comfortably middle-class vegan who is trying to decolonize my own practices. Thus, I think revisionary political veganism is more powerful when it can encompass pluralistic political reasons for veganism.